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STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST

Some forms of Stalinism* have regained ground in the USSR since early 1965. Such gains are noticeable in the cultural, political, economic, and military spheres, as well as in the distinctly less unfavorable press treatment of Stalin and his era. Evidence of a trend towards reviving Stalinism, as well as of opposition against this trend, is discussed below and is given in greater detail in the attached survey.

Whereas the consistency of the evidence is convincing that there has been a step back towards Stalinism by the power establishment, it is difficult to measure the extent of such a reversion. Similarly, there is evidence of determined resistance to Stalinism by a broad range of intellectuals but its strength cannot be easily measured. Nor can popular reactions be gauged. But it is not the purpose to strike 50X1-HUM the balance between the forces for and against Stalinism. Rather, it is to provide the background of an issue that now plagues the leaders of the USSR**, and is expected to continue to cast a long shadow over the future of the Soviet society.

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*We call STALINISM the degenerated form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" wherein the power of the class, or of the party, is replaced by one-man rule and wherein the other dignitaries of party and government, even in the top echelon, are reduced to mere yes-men and tools of the dictator. The decision-making processes that result from the whims of one-man rule are incompatible with the original teachings of Marx and Lenin and are devastating not simply in the expenditure of human life but, even more important for the whole society, politically and historically.

**Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin has made a meaningful statement of policy concerning Stalinism; however, as will be pointed out, there is clear evidence that Brezhnev at least has considered Stalinism to be a major problem.

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Khrushchev's downfall was presumably largely due to the fact that he endangered the status of the privileged new class (Djilas!) -- not physically but in terms of political power; and, at the same time, he failed to satisfy the needs of a modern industrial society and the aspirations of the young generation. The current struggle between De-Khrushchevization and Re-Stalininzation reflects these insoluble contradictions in Soviet society today: the beneficiaries of Stalinism refuse to abandon their privileged position; and vicious Chicom criticism makes it even more difficult to abandon the dictatorship even in words (the Chicoms have intensely criticized the passage in the new CPSU program promising "rule of the entire people").

Literary affairs have provided the fiercest and most overt battleground of Stalinism. The first sign of a reversal of the Khrushchev regime's literary climate was seen in the report of a writers' congress in early March 1965. [redacted] The most forceful reflection of Stalinism is the Sinyavsky-Daniel case [redacted] which pointed up -- but did not equate with -- a host of reminders of Stalin's worst excesses. The role of the KGB in this trial connotes its continued importance in the CPSU bureaucracy and recalls the security police past of some of today's leaders. While reactionary Soviet critics have been increasingly aggressive, they have not shown that they now dominate. The battle over Stalinism may well attain serious proportions at the USSR Writers' Congress which was postponed from June until probably late fall of this year -- possibly at behest of these reactionaries. 50X1-HUM

In the political sphere the most open manifestation of Stalinism appeared in the widely reported efforts by Brezhnev to gain acceptance at the 23rd Party Congress of a "balanced" historical view of Stalin's 30-year reign. [redacted] When this move was resisted, Brezhnev toned down his treatment of Stalin. Subsequently, however, Brezhnev has appeared to be practicing Stalin-style politics, as demonstrated by his heavy-handed strategy at the special May Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 50X1-HUM

CPSU politics have generally shifted from Khrushchev's relatively open, live atmosphere to the present inscrutable dullness. Reading between the lines of the CPSU press, some analysts are speculating that intra-Party relationships may be subject to re-examination and change subsequent to the 2-3 August meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Trends are believed to represent a turn backwards toward Stalinism, and to help to consolidate the strength of Brezhnev and/or Kosygin, both of whom rose to their first positions of prominence during the purges of the 1930's. A possible long-term beneficiary would be Politburo member A.N. Shelepin, one of Stalin's last appointees (as chief of the Komsomol in 1952).

In the Soviet economy's much-needed and long-overdue reform, conservatives whose orientation reflects their training in economic administration during Stalin's time are obviously dragging their feet. The

SECRET [redacted] Cont.) 50X1-HUM

conservatives, who also qualify as bureaucrats, evidently believe that a serious economic reform, including meaningful price revision and direct commercial relationships between managers of supplying and manufacturing organizations, as well as retail outlets, would reduce their role in running the economy from Moscow.

The new leaders' economic policies have shown a trend which is reminiscent of Stalin's era. The early indications of an effort to supply more consumer goods [redacted] and cut down on military outlays have been reversed. The grandiose irrigation and drainage program being pushed especially hard by Brezhnev -- and of questionable economic justification, bears a striking resemblance to Stalin's Great Projects for the Building of Communism. 50X1-HUM

Soviet military leaders have apparently succeeded in getting satisfactory budgetary and supplementary allocations and in having won support for the programs they consider necessary, an achievement which is in line with Stalin's persistent goal of fostering the development of the armed forces. The opinions of some top leaders on recent non-military issues reflect the group's conservatism -- which probably reflects their age, averaging over 60, and the fact that they survived Stalin's purges.

A survey of the press indicates that de-Stalinization has come to a crashing halt. Only twice since March 1965 have Stalin's policies been attacked in the press. And allusions to Stalin have virtually disappeared from press rehabilitations of Stalin's victims, which are also less evident in the central press even though they continue in expurgated form in the provincial press. So far the regime has not been able to rehabilitate Stalin and/or his era in any straightforward manner.

Objections to the present regime's suspected return to Stalinism have been registered from all over the world. Free World criticism focused on the Stalinist aspects of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. Sixteen non-Bloc CP's also criticized the Sinyavsky-Daniel case and the PC of Italy went so far as to declare in its newspaper just before the 23rd Party Congress that it could not accept a re-evaluation of Stalin's role if the Congress should make such a decision. Novotny is also widely reported in the Western press to have objected to Brezhnev's intention to refurbish Stalin's image at the Congress. Furthermore, writers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland voiced disapproval of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case.

In the USSR itself, extraordinary opposition to the Soviets' handling of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case welled up around the time of the trial. Of the greatest significance is the reported letter of mid-February to the Kremlin from 25 leaders in a broad range of professional fields. The letter warns against the rehabilitation of Stalin, and asserts that Western CP's would view Stalin's rehabilitation as "capitulation to the Chinese." This and other internal protests were credited

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by Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian as apparently representing a "last resort" to head off a "formal decision" (implicitly on re-Stalinization) by the conservatives in the CPSU. In spite of subsequent heavy assaults by conservative elements, a few liberal writers have continued in late spring and early summer to register opinions which can be understood to represent opposition to Stalinism.

It is difficult to speculate how the current uncertainty over the eventual place of Stalin and Stalinism in Soviet society will be resolved. In this conflict, the reactionary side apparently has the preponderant power and control: political, military, economic. The liberal side has no real power or organization, but probably has the support of many intellectuals, the most significant of which are undoubtedly the scientists. Where the muted masses -- and particularly the youth -- stand on the question of Stalinism, is not known. But however the sides line up, and whatever may be their mode of conflict, the issue of Stalinism, like several other unresolved questions in the USSR, is overripe and must be settled soon.

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Where speakers and writers, looking at Stalinism historically, shrug off the present as being a vast improvement over Stalinism as practiced by its creator, we use Free World standards to judge Soviet society and to deny respectability to any aspects of Stalinism. For example, some excuse the outrages of the Sinayavsky-Daniel case by suggesting that under Stalin the authors would have had no trial (rather than a patently unjust one violating even the weakly written laws for the protection of Soviet citizens), and would have been summarily executed (rather than being sentenced to long imprisonment at hard labor). They may shrug off reversals of policies promising improved supplies of consumer goods by pointing out that under Stalin thoughts of increased well-being were simply unreasonable. They may excuse Brezhnev's apparent move to garner more power for himself as a pale reflection of Stalin's maneuvers.

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CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Culture

Socialist Realism Begins a New Offensive

For the third time since state awards have existed in the USSR, Soviet literature has been given the cold shoulder. The first occasion was in 1958, at the height of the bitter struggle waged by the Party against the literary revolt known as the "thaw." That writers were being deliberately punished for their "free-thinking" tendencies was clear from the observation made at the time, that "a prize is at one and the same time a form of encouragement and a form of criticism."[1] The second occasion was last year, when creative literature was again ignored and only the sector of journalism was honored by the award of a prize to S. Smirnov for his documentary series on the defense of the fortress of Brest-Litovsk.[2] The reasons for this were doubtless the fact that the previous year had seen the publication of a number of works that had provoked the Party leaders' disapproval and the growing conflict between writers of the progressive and dogmatic schools. Now punishment for disobedience has been meted out again. This is even less surprising in view of the fact that this year's candidates for literary prizes included writers at whom the Party leaders look very much askance—namely, Voznesensky, Martynov and especially Yury German.

The resolution of the Twenty-Third Party Congress devoted its tenth and penultimate paragraph to problems of literature and art:

> The Congress attaches great importance to developing the literature and art of socialist realism. The Party expects of creative workers new and important works that shall impress us by the depth and truthfulness of their reflection of life, by the strength of their ideological *élan* [and] their high artistic skill, actively assist in molding the spiritual physiognomy of the builder of Communism [and] educate in Soviet people lofty moral qualities, devotion to Communist ideals [and] a feeling of civic duty, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.[3]

These lines contain little that is new, but nevertheless it would be a mistake to imagine that literature and the arts really occupy tenth place in order of importance. The congress was, of course, officially devoted to economic problems, but other departments of the country's life were also touched upon, including the one with which we are concerned here. The importance of the arts under a Communist system hardly needs stressing: as the most important means of ideologically influencing the masses, their morganatic marriage with the prosaic problems of economics becomes inevitable.

In his report on behalf of the Central Committee, Brezhnev devoted considerable space to literature and art, drawing attention to causes of dissatisfaction:

[1] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, April 24, 1958.
[2] *Pravda*, April 22, 1965.
[3] *Ibid.*, April 9, 1966.

> Unfortunately, such journeymen of the arts are to be found who, instead of helping the people, choose to specialize in denigrating our regime and slandering our heroic people. Of course, these are only isolated cases, which by no means express the feelings and thoughts of our creative intelligentsia, which is indissolubly linked with the people and the Party. These renegades scoff at what is most holy for every Soviet man—the interests of the socialist homeland. It goes without saying that the Soviet people cannot ignore the shameful activities of such people. It treats them as they deserve.[4]

This should not be taken merely as an approving comment upon the recent trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel, but rather as a warning to the considerable body of Soviet writers who have independent opinions and who are championing freedom of expression. Altogether, it constitutes a principle of the Party's policy with regard to literature and art. This is confirmed by the response which Brezhnev's words found during the subsequent course of the congress. The response came from leading Party officials. A. A. Yepishev, head of the Central Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, when dealing with the ideological struggle, dwelt principally on evidence of a dissatisfactory state of affairs in literature. He called for stricter control of writers:

> The slightest relaxation of attention to ideological work, a lowering of demands in respect of arming cadres with revolutionary theory and the ideological content of works of literature may lead to annoying *contretemps*. This is evidently why on occasion "works" appear which bear traces of apoliticalness, lack of ideological principles, and, in some cases, quite simply anti-Soviet tendencies.[5]

Yepishev involuntarily implied that the "freethinkers" are far from few in number:

> Those lacking ideological integrity and guilty of petty-bourgeois dissoluteness reveal themselves in the fact that some under the banner of freedom of creation, others under the pretext of fighting consequences of the personality cult, yet others under the cloak of "championing" historical truth and authenticity, in fact are coquetting before the mirror of history and are trying to detract from the heroic history and struggle of our Party, the nation and its army, the glorious fighting and revolutionary traditions of older generations, denigrate Soviet reality [and] minimize the greatness of our victory over fascism in the last war.[6]

Not surprisingly in view of his position, Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary S. Pavlov dealt with this question in some detail. He too accused writers who refuse to comply with the Party's demands. Remarking that successes were understandably sometimes accompanied by failures, he added: "We cannot, however, justify the artist who, unable (or unwilling) to get a clear idea of the dialectics of life, takes refuge in a small and musty world of self-analysis, defamation [and] modernist philistinism."[7] The significance of the parenthetical "or unwilling" needs no stressing.

[4] *Ibid.*, March 30, 1966.
[5] *Izvestia*, April 5, 1966.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Pravda*, April 4, 1966.

First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee V. Konotop declared:

> Certain works of literature published recently, particularly in the columns of such journals as *Novy mir* and *Yunost*, and also, unfortunately, certain films and stage productions sometimes give a distorted idea of our Soviet life, isolated shortcomings and difficulties are presented with relish, skepticism and apoliticalness are cultivated and responsible officials are deliberately contrasted with the collectives. In publishing ideologically harmful works, responsible officials of journals and publishing houses are voluntarily or involuntarily departing from the Leninist principles that literature should show Party spirit [*partiinost*] and be rooted in the people [*narodnost*].[8]

The speech made by First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee N. Yegorychev was even sharper in tone, being peppered with expressions such as "a one-sided reflection of the past and present," "a conciliatory attitude toward alien views and feelings," "elements of nihilism and skepticism," "ideological saboteurs," "narrow-minded peevishness," etc. He particularly drew attention to one group of artists and writers, of whom he said: "Unfortunately, there are also people who think not so much about their duty to the people as about what will be said about them abroad."[9] Yegorychev attributed this to a spirit of "political devil-may-care," and urged the need to "apply the Party line militantly and consistently in creative collectives."

Significant of the Party leaders' desire to suppress the champions of artistic freedom, or at least to belittle them in the public eye, is the fact that A. Tvardovsky, candidate member of the Party Central Committee, editor of *Novy mir* and a well-known poet, was not elected a delegate to the congress, whereas other writers of much less importance, such as Sergei Baruzdin, Mikhail Dudin, Sergei Mikhalkov, Mikhail Alekseyev and A. Koptelov, did attend. The "dogmatic" school, on the other hand, was well represented, including V. Kochetov, N. Gribachev, G. Markov, N. Rylenkov and V. Kozhevnikov. (At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, it was Tvardovsky who delivered the main speech on behalf of the writers.)

It is of interest to see what writers had to say at the recent congress. The Party leaders were followed by G. Markov, Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR, who began with the dubious assertion that Soviet literature was as old as the Soviet regime. (For some time after the Revolution, the leading writers were men to whom one could hardly apply the epithet "Soviet.") Markov proceeded to bang the drum for socialist realism, which, he said, "provokes especial indignation among our enemies." The main point of his speech was a condemnation of writers' "free-thinking" tendencies:

> In recent years, we have seen the appearance of works [of literature] in which deep artistic analysis of the complex problems of today gave way to superficial descriptions, one-sided views or literary mannerisms, which on closer inspection proved to be nothing but an imitation of the fashionable models of bourgeois litera-

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1966.

ture. In every case, the result was the same: the overall picture of our life was distorted, reality was artificially confined by the artist to the circumstances of a single fact or event, mostly isolated from the general current, and came into conflict with the truth . . . of our age.[10]

In his contribution, Sholokhov even outdid the "dogmatics" in his condemnation of progressive writers. Apart from his attacks on those whose works have been published abroad, his attitude to persons (and collectives) championing writers who have been condemned and "subjected to repression" is of interest:

I am not ashamed of those who have slandered their homeland and dragged in the mud everything that is most sacred to us. They are amoral. I am ashamed of those who tried and are trying to defend them, whatever their motives for doing so may be.

I am doubly ashamed of those who offer their services and apply for condemned renegades to be entrusted to them on bail.[11]

The following passage is also remarkable:

All the time I keep thinking of one thing. If these young rascals with their black records had been living in the memorable period of the twenties, when sentences were passed on the basis, not of strictly delimited articles of the criminal code, but of a "revolutionary sense of justice," these werewolves would have received a far more severe punishment.[12]

These attacks, taken in conjunction with Sholokhov's extremely unconvincing, even helpless, analysis of the work of Soviet writers, offers further evidence in support of the view that the award of last year's Nobel Prize for Literature was misguided.

From these excerpts, it is fairly clear that although the congress was primarily devoted to economic questions, literature and art occupied an important place in the proceedings, and that here most attention was devoted to the conflict between progressive writers and the supporters of Party conservatism. It becomes more difficult to grasp the full scale of this conflict since many literary contributions are either not published at all or publication is held up for long periods with the result that they lose some of their force and topicality. Despite the severity of the censorship, however, some things get through. We may take as an example the novel by the Belorussian writer V. Bykov, *The Dead Feel No Pain*, which was published in the first two issues for this year of *Novy mir*. This gives a vivid portrait of the typical Stalinist, the fanatical and heartless Communist, in the characters of Captain Sakhno and the state prosecutor of a military tribunal, Major Gorbatyuk. Although no coward, Sakhno always manages to be out of danger. For him, all considerations of humanity fade before the law. Without hesitation, he shoots wounded men when his unit is forced to retreat and imposes the death sentence for negligible offenses. He decides the fate of a German prisoner with the words, "Strangle him!"

[10] *Ibid.*, April 4, 1966.
[11] *Ibid.*, April 2, 1966.
[12] *Ibid.*

Another example of the recent tendency in Soviet literature to portray the Stalinist not as a blind executor of orders but as embodying all the qualities which were responsible for the lawlessness of the Stalin era may be found in V. Popov's novel recently published in *Moskva*. One of the characters is a certain Karygin, who became an oblast Party committee secretary in 1937:

> At thirty, [he is] an oblast committee secretary, invested with the power to punish or pardon, to decide all questions, both economic and political . . . But the main thing is that whatever he does he gets off scot-free; he has unlimited possibilities for suppressing discontent and criticism. If they attack you at a meeting, you can label [the critic] a slanderer who is undermining the authority of the oblast committee secretary and consequently the authority of the Party which gave him this post . . .[13]

Such literature on the Stalin era was condemned by speakers at the congress, particularly Yepishev. The Party leaders had clearly decided to stick to the orthodox ideological line with regard to literature and to tolerate departures from Communist dogma only in the economic sphere. In general, ideological principles are considered to be of greater importance than the country's economic structure and the Party's organizational activities. If this had not been so, the Communist system would have collapsed after the introduction of NEP. At that time, the Party temporarily sacrificed its basic economic principles while holding fast to its ideological line. Thus, whatever temporary concessions it may make, the Party can on no account allow its own members to take the ideology lightly. Party members, for example, were in no wise concerned by the legal recognition of religious bodies during World War II. Since ideological positions are all-important, it follows that art, as the sole means of implanting this ideology in the masses, must be firmly confined to a subsidiary role. The teachings of the founding fathers of Communism, Marx and Engels, and the heritage of the practical revolutionary Lenin are studied, if at all, only by the theoreticians, not by the masses, which can only be reached by emotional means, and now that the romantic appeal of the Revolution has faded and a critical approach is spreading the Party leaders are obliged to take whatever measures seem necessary in order to preserve the appeal of art. Thus, the freedom of action that has been granted to science and technology remains forbidden fruit as far as literature and the arts are concerned.

This attitude of the Party is reflected in the representation of writers' organizations in the higher Party organs. Only two writers, Sholokhov and Korneichuk, have retained their positions as full members of the Central Committee, and of the three who were formerly candidate members—Tvardovsky, Surkov and Gribachev—only the last has survived in this position.

According to long-established tradition, writers' congresses and similar meetings are held soon after a Party congress, while the latter's resolutions are still fresh in people's minds. The next congress of the Union of Writers of the

[13] *Moskva*, 1966, No. 1, p. 53.

USSR is to take place this year. Preparations for this event are already under way, and are dominated by the line adopted at the recent Party congress. During the second half of April, the board of the Writers' Union of the RSFSR held a plenary session at which the Party's demands were presented by the "non-Party dogmatic" N. Sobolev, who said:

> At this [the Twenty-Third Party] Congress, questions of literature fortunately received very close attention, which was friendly but at times also severe. The most important conclusion, as may also be seen from the speeches at our plenary session, is yet another firm assertion of the Leninist principle of the Party spirit of literature, departures from which, as the opinions of congress delegates showed, lead to regrettable and sometimes dangerous results.[14]

In his address, M. Alekseyev gave an account of the state of affairs in the main *genres* of literature and emphasized the viability of socialist realism. He declared:

> The tasks imposed on the Party and the people at the Twenty-Third Congress . . . oblige writers to put their entire literary household into a state of complete military preparedness and to mobilize all types of weapons, all *genres* of literature.[15]

A similar tone was adopted by a number of other writers, chiefly of the dogmatic school:

> Today's urgent need is for the creation of full-blooded artistic characters in which the best features of our contemporaries—worker, kolkhoznik, intellectual, soldier—are accumulated.[16]

The first meeting of this kind to take place in the Union republics after the Party congress was the fifth congress of the Tadzhik Writers' Union, devoted to the stabilization of the subsidiary role of literature. Much attention was given to young writers who displayed "a retreat into the intimate world of personal experience, sometimes an incomprehensible *Weltschmerz*."[17]

In this way, the Party leaders hope to put an end to the "unsatisfactory state of affairs" which provoked so much comment at the Party congress. Neither the congress nor the meetings that followed, however, appeared to recognize the one serious obstacle in their path, namely, the process of spiritual emancipation, which is constantly gaining momentum.

A. Gayer

[14] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, April 29, 1966, p. 3.
[15] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 26, 1966.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*, April 28, 1966.

August 1966

Stalinism*: Past and Present

Stalin's reign of 30 years left deep imprints on Soviet society: his influence and the self-serving interests of the CPSU bureaucracy have resisted subsequent efforts to eradicate the effects of his policies and personality. These efforts, usually termed de-Stalinization**, have been sporadic. Right after Stalin's death the Malenkov regime adopted policies which differed radically from Stalin's. Khrushchev, in bidding for and rising to power in 1954 and 1955, urged and then reinstated some of Stalin's policies (e.g., the clear-cut primacy of heavy industry). During most of his 9 ½ year reign however, Khrushchev's policies led the USSR away from Stalinism -- a development dramatized by his denigration of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and his removal of Stalin's body from its resting place next to Lenin's in the Kremlin mausoleum during the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.

When Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed power in October 1964 they at first paid less attention to Stalinism than to Khrushchev's "subjectivism." Beginning around the first of March 1965, however, evidence has pointed to a shift away from de-Stalinization and towards policies which smack of a Stalinist flavor.

In the realm of literature, the most forceful reminder of Stalinism is seen in the Sinyavsky-Daniel Case. The sudden move of the KGB to arrest the authors in September 1965, their 5-months' detention incommunicado before the trial, the patently rigged trial in February 1966, the harsh sentences of 7 years at hard labor for Sinyavsky and 5 years at hard labor for Daniel, and the tenuousness of the charges -- producing anti-Soviet propaganda -- all conjured up a grim image of Stalin's ways.

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*To some, Stalinism is equated with unprincipled political methods, mass starvation of peasants, blood baths, ruthless dictatorship, police repressions, concentration camps, and thought control. Observers of contemporary Soviet society, when speaking of Stalinism, usually refer to such subjects as cultural and political orthodoxy, the degree of centralized planning and operation of the economy, and priority to the military in allocations of scarce goods.

**Khrushchev deemed elimination of the deadening effects of Stalin's methods and psychological climate necessary for the institution of progressive changes in the Soviet society. According to Robert Conquest, such de-Stalinization could mean the beginning of the end of Soviet communism.

(Cont.)

Virtually unheralded, however, were the earliest manifestations of a reversal of the Khrushchev regime's generally more permissive policies in this realm. The first sign of such a reversal was seen in early March 1965, in a published report of the RSFSR Writers' Congress at which the so-called conservatives* upset the prevailing dominance of the liberals. During the rest of 1965 the forces of liberalism and reaction clashed with increasing intensity. The liberals evidently resisted with such stubbornness that the CPSU was obliged to take the extreme measure of cracking down hard on Sinyavsky and Daniel, who were popular and respected members of the unanimously anti-Stalinist liberal group.

Following the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial the orthodox critics have become increasingly aggressive in their assaults on liberal writers, especially in the pages of the RSFSR Writers' Union journal, Oktyabr' (October) and the Red Army newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). On the other hand Novy Mir (New World), the monthly known for its publication of liberal views and novels which conflict with the guidelines of socialist realism, has fallen 2 months late and appears to be marking time by publishing little which the reactionary critics can seize upon. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Writers' Congress has been postponed until November 1966, and the oft-postponed USSR Writers' Congress (already 2 years overdue) was once again pushed back, this time from June until probably late fall 1966.

Evidently, the reactionaries are aiming to get the corpus of Soviet writers to recognize what Ivan Kuz'nichev** termed "the failures of ... modern creative works" and the "disastrous ... one-sided, tendentious character" of the (anti-Stalinist) themes which are concerned with the concentration camp and justice, as well as the undesirability of works depicting the lack of military preparedness in the period preceding Hilter's invasion of the USSR. In this way, the reactionaries would hope to get authors to conform to a new version of socialist realism and to condemn the prized product of liberal writers during the past decade.

In political matters the most flagrant manifestation of Stalinism was seen in the widely reported efforts by Brezhnev to gain acceptance at the 23rd Party Congress of a "balanced" historical view of Stalin's 30-year reign. This move was resisted (see discussion below) and finally shelved.

In practice, however, Stalin-sytle politics are increasingly evident. For example, at the May 1966 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU Brezhnev was the only Soviet leader of major standing to speak on the major subject of the plenum, the proposed grandiose and very costly program of irrigation and drainage. Kosygin, though present and presumably still responsible for the over-all management of the economy, was silent.

*A better term would be reactionaries, or the orthodox supporters of the Party line which calls for adherence to "socialist realism." See attachment entitled "Current Soviet Affairs" by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, for a discussion of socialist realism.

**In Oktyabr', June 1966.

Furthermore, Kosygin was indirectly attacked when Brezhnev charged industrial ministers (who are responsible to Koysgin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers) with failure to support the irrigation and drainage program.

Party politics in general have shown a discernible trend from the relatively open, live atmosphere under Khrushchev to the present inscrutable dullness. The 23rd Party Congress was, on the surface at least, lacking in significant developments, although much speculation has been spurred by the restoration by the Congress of Stalin's old title of General Secretary and its award to Brezhnev. Hints of undercurrents of political uncertainity came out in speeches at the Party Congress, and subsequent articles in the CP press (Pravda 20 June and 20 July; Partiinaya Zhizn') suggest that intra-Party relationships are due for reexamination and change.

All of these manifestations -- a bid to restore the respectability of Stalin's name and era, the apparent effort of Brezhnev to assume the sole leadership of a new and important program, and the shrouded movement of Party affairs -- are in line with trends towards a Stalinist political climate. Such trends can be expected to help consolidate the positions of Brezhnev and/or Kosygin, both of whom rose to their first positions of prominence during the purges of the 1930's. A possible long-term beneficiary of a trend back towards Stalinism would be Politburo member A.N. Shelepin, one of Stalin's last appointees (as chief of the Komsomol in 1952). On the other hand, such trends would present obstacles to the ambitions of the younger members of the CP who have no unbreakable ties with Stalinism.

The Soviet economy may be considered immune from the threat of a return to Stalin's crude and rigid system which was designed to generate maximum industrial growth at the expense of the material well-being of the consumer (worker), with little regard to efficiency. Nevertheless, the habit patterns of the bulk of the administrators trained in Stalin's time will undoubtedly continue to influence the development of the Soviet economy. One indication of this is the apparent foot-dragging by conservatives in the matter of the long overdue and badly needed economic reform.* The conservatives are undoubtedly aware that the institution of meaningful price revision and subsequent direct contacts between suppliers, manufacturers and retail outlets will eventually deprive many party and government officials of their bureaucratic roles in planning and operating the economy from

*Surprisingly, the veteran Chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Wages, A.P. Volkov, continues in that post which is of crucial importance in the elaboration of price reforms. In the fall of 1965 Volkov expressed a strong bias against the value of systems as instruments for the solution of economic problems.

Moscow. Under economic reform, executive talent will become far more important than political influence. The trend of economic policies under the new leaders has been reminiscent of Stalin. Kosygin, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in December 1964, set forth a goal of providing more consumer goods. Issued at the same time, the 1965 budget called for military expenditures to be sharply reduced from the planned 1964 level. In contrast, the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan clearly short-changes the consumer; and the current indications are that military and space expenditures will increase. Furthermore, the granddose irrigation and drainage program recently being pushed by Brezhnev (although it incorporates several features supported by Khrushchev) bears a distinct resemblance to Stalin's Great Projects. Two of those 5 projects were suspended shortly after Stalin's death, the implicit explanation being that they were unjustifiable at a time (as at present) when the economy was overextended.

Soviet military leaders have succeeded in fostering the development of the armed forces, a persistent Stalinist goal since the mid-1930's. Defense outlays were budgeted to decline by .5 million rubles in 1965 and to increase by .63 billion rubles (to 13.43 billion) in 1966, and Soviet military leaders have expressed satisfaction with the steps being taken to provide for the country's defense.

In recent discussions not directly related to military matters, high Soviet officers have generally expressed highly conservative attitudes. This probably reflects the fact that the great majority of the top-ranked military leaders are over 60, and thus benefited (or at least were not destroyed) by Stalin's purges.

Roughly paralleling the above reflections of a trend towards Stalinism in Soviet society are indications from the press that de-Stalinization has come to a crashing halt. Whereas Stalin's policies were frequently attacked (and used as a guise for criticisms that would otherwise have been unprintable) during the latter part of the Khrushchev era, there have been noted only 2 criticisms of Stalin's policies since March 1965.* And whereas during the Khrushchev era Stalin was named in published accounts of the rehabilitation of his victims,** Stalin's name and even allusions to Stalin

*These criticisms, in July and November 1965, both pertained to Stalin's pre-1935 policy of insisting on hostility to right Social Democrats in Germany [an attitude now impeding the popular front strategy].

**For example, in Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia) Vol. 3, 11 Feb 1963, former State Planning Commission chief N.A. Voznesensky was rehabilitated as follows: "unjustifiably condemned on the bases of the provocationary 'Leningrad case,' fabricated by L. Beriya with the participation of G. Malenkov and the sanction of Stalin."

have been dropped. On 30 January 1966 in Pravda an article by Soviet historians criticized the use of the euphemism for the Stalin era: "the period of the cult of the personality." Subsequently, not only the expression but even the world "cult" has virtually dropped from use in the Soviet press. Stalin's victims have continued to be rehabilitated; but most of the recent rehabilitations have appeared in the provincial press only and have been toned down to such mild expressions as: "victim of false accusations"; or "illegally repressed"; or "in March 1938 his life was tragically broken off."

Straightforward attempts to rehabilitate Stalin have been few and short-lived. Brezhnev created a furor in his speech commemorating V-E Day in May 1965 by mentioning Stalin's name in positive terms. As noted above, Brezhnev is widely reported to have wanted to gain acceptance of Stalin's reign at the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966. Instead Brezhnev (probably for reasons pointed out below) limited his speech on this subject to some favorable remarks about Stalin, justifying his military policies. Later, on the anniversary of Hitler's invasion of the USSR, Defense Minister Malinovsky mentioned Stalin in a positive context. The meager response and follow-through on the above-noted trial balloons (if indeed such they were) is undoubtedly attributable to the enormous success of Khrushchev's long, hard-hitting campaign denigrating Stalin.

Objections to the present regime's signs of a return to Stalinism have been registered from all over the world. Free World criticism has centered on the Stalinist aspects of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. Reportedly, the Soviet leaders were greatly surprised by the intensity, duration, and scope of these criticisms.

Non-Bloc Communist Parties (16 at last count) also focused their criticism on the Sinyavsky-Daniel case, partly because of Stalinism but mostly because of the damaging reflection the case made on their own popular image at home. The CP of Italy, evidently after having gotten word of Brezhnev's intention to refurbish Stalin's image at the 23rd Party Congress, published beforehand in L'Unità the strong declaration that:

> "If the Congress, in re-evaluating Stalin's role, were to minimize the judgments made by the Twentieth Congress [in 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his "secret speech"], we couldn't accept its decision."

From the Communist-governed countries of Eastern Europe have come several reports of protest. Writers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland voiced disapproval of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. For example, an article in the Hungarian literary weekly Elet es Irodalum favorably assessed Sinyavsky's works and stated that he had a right to criticize things that were "wrong and deserved to be criticized." Czechoslovak CP boss Novotny evidently received the same information as the Italians concerning Brezhnev's intentions to refurbish Stalin's image at the 23rd Party Congress, for he is widely reported in the Western press to have expressed his disapproval of such a move by the Soviets.

In the USSR itself, extraordinary opposition to the Soviets' handling of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case welled up about the time of the trial. One petition to the Soviet government, signed in mid-March by 40 prominent Moscow writers including Yevtushenko and Solzhenitsyn, cited the harshness of the penalties, the dubiousness of the legal procedures, and the consequent reversal of literary liberalization since Stalin's death. Another petition is reported to have been sent from Leningrad writers. Of greatest significance inside the USSR is the reported letter of mid-February to the Kremlin from 25 leaders in a far broader range of fields (included are Peter Kapitsa and 4 other top atomic scientists, the prima ballerina Maya Plisetskaya, former ambassador to Great Britain Ivan Maysky, other prominent writers, and the leading film director Mihail Romm). The letter warns against the rehabilitation of Stalin, which could lead to "a new split in the ranks of the Communists, and this time between us and the CP's of the West." The latter, the protest continued, would view Stalin's rehabilitation as "capitulation to the Chinese." The commentary at that time of the Manchester Guardian's Soviet expert, Victor Zorza, was that the protests by the Soviet writers and other intellectuals apparently represented a "last resort" to head off a "formal decision" (implicitly on re-Stalinization) by the conservatives in the CPSU.

Evidence of continuing internal opposition to Stalinism is scant and difficult to evaluate. Individual literary figures still venture implied criticism of Stalinist practices. For example V. Pertsov, a critic on the editorial board of Voprosy Literatury (Problems of Literature), at a meeting in May of the board of the usually liberal Moscow Writers' Organization, lamented that the works of a number of writers have not been adequately published. Pertsov mentioned the names of several liberal writers, including Anna Akhmatova, who had suffered from Stalinism. His representations, however, were reportedly received coldly and with shock. Another incident is the publication on 22 July 1966 in Literaturnaya Rossiya (Literary Russia) of the author K. Simonov's story of his assignment in the late 1940's to induce Ivan Bunin, the Nobel Prize winning Russian emigré author, to return to his native land. Bunin, according to this account, was repelled by the news of the repressive acts of Stalin's cultural hatchet man, Andrei Zhdanov, and instead of accepting the invitation to the USSR Bunin stepped up his attacks on Stalin's cultural terrorism. Another sign of opposition is seen in Novy Mir's continuing publication, albeit in a less bold manner, even though its liberal editor, A. Tvardovsky, has survived a rumored threat of being ousted. These incidents, as well as the mere fact that the reactionaries have been keeping up a drumfire of assaults on liberal writers and ideas is testimony of the continuing existence of internal opposition to Stalinism.

The current balance of Stalinism is difficult to strike, however, because of the diffused and inadequate information on pertinent developments. It is obvious, nevertheless, that Stalinism rests somewhere between low and high tide. The surge of anti-Stalinism has been halted; but the flow back towards Stalinism has met significant head-on resistance and is buffeted by cross currents. The present regime has made no commitment to a course of action regarding Stalin as a person or Stalinism as a method of government. It is difficult to see, however, how the Soviet "command society" can long endure uncertainty on this key issue.

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